Dred Scott vs Dr. Emerson

Phoebie Whitesides, 1 Mo. 473 (1824), in which the judicial corpse held that a hard worker had become excess because she had resided in the waive territory of Illinois in 1799. Specifically, the court stated that the U.S. brass's interstate favor provision required that Winny's status as a free someone in Illinois made her a free person in moment under the terms of the nor'-west polity (1787, which banned striverry north and west of the Ohio River). This line of ratiocination was followed in numerous subsequent bit cases, including Rachael, A charwoman of Color v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350 (1836), Ralph (A humanness of Color) v. Duncan, 3 Mo. 194 (1833), Tramell v. Adam, A dense Man, 2 Mo. 100 (1829), and Merry v. Tiffin, 1 Mo. 391 (1827). Rachael, A adult female of Color v. Walker, is particularly instructive because it concerned a slave taken into molybdenum dirt by her master, an Army officer. The Missouri court held in that case that, although slaveholders did non lose their shoes rights in their slaves merely by passing through a free state, a slave held in Missouri Territory for more than two years was free under Missouri Compromise. Still, there were contrary cases, such as that of Theoteste v. Chouteau, 2 Mo. 93 (1829), in which the Missouri court held that slaves who were taken past the Northwest Ordinance could continue to be held as slaves under speculation of vested rights. In Scott's case, the lower Missouri state court given him a favor

Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

Ralph (A Man of Color) v. Duncan, 3 Mo. 194 (1833).

Winny v. Phoebie Whitesides, 1 Mo. 473 (1824).

The United States in 1857 was not a true federal system. Rather, it was still a system whereby the states kept up(p) reign over matters within their borders. The purpose of the federal system during this time was largely to regulate disputes between the states, such as the one in Scott's case between a slave who claimed Missouri citizenship and his master, who then resided in New York. only if the accost held that the U.S.

Constitution did not provide for citizenship for Negroes and then concluded that this meant that Scott "could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States" (406). In so doing, the Court fundamentally abrogated the Missouri's sovereignty to determine who could be its citizens even as the Court argued that Missouri had the sole sovereignty to make such determinations. In their dissents, Justices Curtis and McLean essentially attempted to prove Scott's freedom by referring to commercial-grade equity conflicts principles. Interestingly enough, this might seem inappropriate given that Scott himself comprise the question as one of both citizenship rights and state conflicts of laws. But Justice Taney denied Scott's citizenship application on the ground that Scott was a commercial property. It would seem appropriate, therefore, by Taney's own reasoning, that commercial law principles would be appropriately applied in the case. The Court also referred to side law for the proposition that Africans were of an inferior order and had been enslaved for their benefit and for the stinting benefit of the English and, thus, they were property, which property rights in them had been recognized through the American Revolution (406). Thus, the Court held that these "fixed opinions concerning that race" refractory the "general terms used in the Constitution of the Uni
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